




Oxford
Analytica

VAPOR Country Risk Ratings: COVID-19

Value at Political Risk country ratings
for decision-makers



Your quarterly guide
to measuring
and mapping
political risk

WillisTowersWatson

VAPOR

Some information contained in this document may be compiled from third party sources we consider to be reliable. However, we do not guarantee and are not responsible for the accuracy of such. The views expressed in this document are not necessarily those of Willis Towers Watson or Oxford Analytica, who accept no responsibility for the content or quality of any third-party websites or publications to which we refer.

This publication and all the information material, data and contents contained herein are for general informational purposes only, are not presented for purposes of reliance, and do not constitute risk management advice, legal advice, tax advice, investment advice or any other form of professional advice. This publication is for general discussion and/or guidance only, is not intended to be relied upon, and action based on or in connection with anything contained herein should not be taken without first obtaining specific advice from a suitably qualified professional.

Oxford Analytica

5 Alfred Street, Oxford OX1 4EH
T +44 1865 261 600

Any reproduction or distribution of this study in whole or in part without the written consent of Oxford Analytica Ltd is strictly forbidden.

Executive summary

VAPOR Ratings measure current and future levels of commercial political risk for more than 160 countries based on expected frequency and severity of losses to political risk. Each rating is produced by combining latest available data with country analyst expertise.

In this special edition to capture the impact of COVID-19, the speed with which developments are outpacing data means that analyst expertise is particularly important. The identified risks and opportunities in this edition reflect analyst coverage as we look out to 1H20.

One aspect of the crisis with particular relevance for political risk is the extent to which governments are assuming emergency powers. While understandable in the current environment, in some countries such measures will present an opportunity to limit opposition and interfere with business and investors. Furthermore, as more countries implement tighter restrictions over longer periods, the risk of political violence will rise as populations react to shortages, displacement and unemployment.

In Central and Eastern Europe, politically, COVID-19 is not creating new attitudes but amplifying existing ones. It offers national-populists a fertile environment for centralising decision-making further and adopting measures incompatible with normal democratic standards. In the Middle East, private sector borrowers may face supply chain issues that undermine their ability to pay, while government projects may again seek to delay or suspend payments to suppliers.


Contents

4	VAPOR Ratings	10	VAPOR Ratings – 2Q2020
5	Short and medium-term impacts of COVID-19	12	VAPOR Ratings methodology

VAPOR Ratings

VAPOR Ratings provide a relative measure of commercial political risk for more than 160 countries. Each rating incorporates the expected losses for five perils across 14 industries. The ratings are designed not only to anticipate where unexpected country-level exposure will emerge, but also where headline risk may conceal opportunities for well-prepared organisations. Unlike generic political risk scores, each VAPOR Rating is tied to a corresponding estimate of expected loss (information that is available upon request).

Figure 1. Map of VAPOR Ratings 2Q2020



Source: Oxford Analytica, Willis Towers Watson

AR+ AR AR-
Extremely low to low-risk environment

Investors in countries that are rated AR are typically exposed to infrequent and low impact (immaterial) business risk, and are largely comfortable with concentrated exposure and passive management.

BR+ BR BR-
Medium-risk environment

Investors in countries with a BR rating are typically exposed to frequent but medium impact (sometimes material) business risk. Mitigation occurs through broad-based exposure and active management.

CR+ CR CR-
High-risk environment

Investors in CR countries are typically exposed to ongoing and high impact (material) business risk. Exposure in one of these countries typically requires active on-the-ground management.

F
Unmanageable risk environment

In a country rated F, political risk has an outsized negative impact on the overall business environment. Risk conditions in these countries exceed the ability of institutional and corporate investors to manage the risk.

Short and medium-term impacts of COVID-19

The impact of COVID-19 is inflicting severe supply chain disruption (trade embargo losses) on global businesses. VAPOR's other areas of concern -- **expropriation, political violence, currency inconvertibility and sovereign non-payment** -- currently lag these losses, but the collapse in oil prices and tourist spending, to name but two, present emerging and escalating challenges to the cost of political risk that will only grow more severe while this pandemic persists.

Europe is not only the epicentre – VAPOR shows that it is, in relative terms, also the world's most politically vulnerable region. This is driven by a combination of direct (demographics), indirect (trade and interdependence) and economic (budgetary and fiscal) factors. Coupled with the state of domestic and regional politics, 15 of the 21 countries downgraded for political risks related to COVID-19 are European. Although Europe is far from alone.

Political risks to business are exemplified by happenings in Central and Eastern Europe (CEE) and the Middle East. **In CEE, political violence and expropriation risks must be watched carefully.** Politically, COVID-19 is not creating new attitudes but amplifying existing ones. It offers national-populists a fertile environment for centralising decision-making further and adopting measures incompatible with normal democratic standards. **There is a risk that temporary restrictions on individual freedoms will be used not just to deal with the health crisis.** A further strengthening of ruling parties' grip on state resource allocation is to be expected.

Governments in CEE, as elsewhere, will be judged on how well they handle the pandemic. The public will get behind **states of emergency and restrictive measures** as long as governments can present them as resolving the crisis. Many leaders will downplay expert opinion, resort to nationalism and target external 'enemies'.

In **Hungary**, the ruling party is pushing through laws that limit freedom of expression under the guise of stopping the spread of misinformation, or of information that alarms the public or interferes with the government's mission to protect. Such measures leave great scope for interpretation.

Certainly, the prospect of an indefinite state of emergency has worried the opposition. Parties opposed to the government have asked for a three-month limit. Orban has argued that this is not enough as Hungary could be in worse shape then.

In **Bulgaria**, Prime Minister Boyko Borisov obtained parliamentary support for a bill amending the penal code to punish spreading false information with heavy fines and prison terms. President Rumen Radev vetoed the bill, saying it attacked “the last vestiges of free speech” and could be used against “any inconvenient free thinking”.

In **Poland**, Prime Minister Mateusz Morawiecki declared at a press conference on March 13 that most cases of COVID-19 were imported by foreigners or Poles returning from abroad. The underlying message is that nations would not be in crisis if there were less freedom of movement.


This is in line with previous anti-migration and nationalist agendas. So far, Poland has refrained from any further tightening of the executive’s grip on democracy. However, given its history of challenging the rule of law, the governing Law and Justice Party is likely to curb a critical press at least.

In all these countries, restrictive measures could remain in place after the crisis. **The public are not protesting against repression now, but their attitudes will depend on how governments handle the crisis.**

Most CEE governments are likely to suspend local or national elections, at least for the next six months. The exception is Poland, which expects to hold the May presidential election, although the main opposition is not campaigning because it would violate social distancing and will probably boycott the vote altogether.

In the Middle East, the global pandemic and plummeting oil prices are challenging Gulf countries' economic models.

Figure 2. Middle East: Confirmed cases of COVID-19, as of April 1, 2020




Source: Johns Hopkins University Center for Systems Science and Engineering; media reports
Graphic: Oxford Analytica

A combination of shocks associated with the COVID-19 pandemic and policy responses have dramatically changed the economic outlook for Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) states. Lower oil and gas revenues are the consequence of the global crisis for regional economies, **but tourism, financial and professional services are also taking a major hit, undermining non-energy growth.**

This crisis has prompted an almost unprecedented stimulus from advanced economies, which has been partly matched in the GCC. Regional economies followed the Federal Reserve in cutting interest rates and most have rolled out credit support mechanisms to maintain credit to businesses, households and support the banks.

All producers in the Middle East region require an oil price of over 50 dollars per barrel to meet their budgetary spending, according to IMF calculations based on budget guidance available in late 2019. However, **only Saudi Arabia can manage major production increases to offset low prices.** Meanwhile, the decline in local demand and global investment is likely to weaken non-oil revenues.

Figure 3. Middle East: Select oil producers' average break-even prices (dollars per barrel)



Source: IMF

Regional economies vary dramatically in their foreign currency liquidity, and the COVID-19 shock is likely to reinforce that inequality. **Prolonged oil prices below 40 dollars per barrel would amplify concerns about debt sustainability in Oman and Bahrain,** which might need further regional support.

Weaker capital flows will further increase the cost of debt -- a particular challenge for those two countries and Saudi Arabia, which have dominated regional and indeed emerging market dollar debt issuance in the last few years. Credit default swap spreads have already widened, and if this continues, the fiscal divergence in the region will increase.

Growth remains highly reliant on government spending, itself supported directly or indirectly by oil revenues. Although non-oil revenue is rising from a low base, it is likely to fall short due to weaker global and local growth in 2020.

Government rhetoric supporting development plans is likely to outpace activity, with some, less essential projects delayed, especially if local quarantines and shutdowns are extended. However, Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, Qatar and the UAE can use off-balance sheet sources like sovereign development investment funds to maintain spending.

Across the Middle East, governments' financial needs are likely to tighten local money supply and reduce available credit for the private sector despite support measures. Gulf banks face several challenges, particularly in Qatar, Bahrain, Kuwait and the UAE, which have larger outstanding loan books and are less well capitalised than those in Saudi Arabia.

Private sector borrowers may face **supply chain issues that undermine their ability to pay, while government projects may again seek to delay payments to suppliers**. Meanwhile, lower interest rates narrow bank interest margins, a global challenge that hits their revenues.

On the positive side, the GCC is importing easier monetary policy and benefits from lower global yields. The region's central banks cut interest rates along with the Federal Reserve and have benefited from low financing costs in dollars, despite a recent widening of credit spreads.

The banking system and off-balance sheet government entities in **Dubai and Abu Dhabi remain much stronger than in 2009's debt crisis. However, property oversupply will be difficult to manage.**

VAPOR Ratings – 2Q2020

Extremely low to low-risk

- AR+
- AR
- AR-

Medium-risk

- BR+
- BR
- BR-

High-risk

- CR+
- CR
- CR-

Unmanageable risk

- F

	VAPOR Rating		VAPOR Rating
	Afghanistan		CR-
	Albania		BR
▼	Algeria	▲	Egypt
	Angola		BR-
	Argentina		BR
	Armenia		CR+
	Australia		CR
▼	Austria		CR
	Azerbaijan		AR
	Bahrain		AR
	Bangladesh		AR-
	Belarus		BR-
▼	Belgium		BR-
	Benin		BR
	Bhutan		BR
	Bolivia		BR-
	Bosnia and Hercegovina		BR
	Botswana		BR
	Brazil		BR
	Brunei		BR+
	Bulgaria		BR+
	Burkina Faso		BR-
	Burundi		CR
	Cambodia		CR
	Cameroon		CR
	Canada		CR+
	Central African Republic		CR
	Chad		CR
	Chile		CR
▼	China		CR
	Colombia		CR
	Congo-Brazzaville		CR
	Congo-Kinshasa		CR
	Costa Rica		CR
	Croatia		CR
	Cyprus		CR
	Czech Republic		CR
▼	Denmark		CR
	Djibouti		CR
	Dominican Republic		CR
	Ecuador		CR
	Egypt		CR
	El Salvador		CR
	Equatorial Guinea		CR
	Eritrea		CR
	Estonia		CR
	Ethiopia		CR
▼	Finland		CR
▼	France		CR
	Gabon		CR
	Georgia		CR
▼	Germany		CR
	Ghana		CR
	Greece		CR
	Guatemala		CR
	Guinea		CR
	Guinea-Bissau		CR
	Guyana		CR
	Haiti		CR
	Honduras		CR
	Hungary		CR
	Iceland		CR
	India		CR
	Indonesia		CR
	Iran		CR
	Iraq		CR
▼	Ireland		CR
	Israel		CR
	Italy		CR
	Ivory Coast		CR
	Jamaica		CR
	Japan		CR
	Jordan		CR
	Kazakhstan		CR
	Kenya		CR
	Kuwait		CR
	Kyrgyzstan		CR
	Laos		CR
	Latvia		CR
▼	Lebanon		CR
	Lesotho		CR
	Liberia		CR

	VAPOR Rating
Libya	CR-
▲ Lithuania	AR
▼ Luxembourg	AR
▲ Madagascar	BR-
Malawi	BR-
Malaysia	BR+
▲ Mali	CR+
Mauritania	CR+
Mauritius	BR+
Mexico	BR-
Moldova	BR-
Mongolia	BR
Montenegro	BR
Morocco	BR
Mozambique	CR
Myanmar	BR-
Namibia	BR-
Nepal	BR-
▼ Netherlands	AR
New Zealand	AR
Nicaragua	BR-
Niger	CR+
▼ Nigeria	CR
▲ North Korea	CR-
North Macedonia	BR-
▼ Norway	AR
Oman	BR+
▲ Pakistan	BR-
▼ Panama	BR+
Papua New Guinea	BR-
Paraguay	BR
Peru	BR+
Philippines	BR
Poland	BR+
▼ Portugal	AR-
Puerto Rico	BR+
Qatar	BR+
Romania	BR+
Russia	BR-
Rwanda	BR-

	VAPOR Rating
Saudi Arabia	BR
Senegal	BR-
Serbia	BR
Sierra Leone	CR
Singapore	AR
Slovakia	AR-
Slovenia	AR
▲ Somalia	CR+
South Africa	BR-
South Korea	BR+
▼ Spain	BR+
Sri Lanka	BR-
Sudan	CR-
Suriname	BR-
Swaziland	BR-
▼ Sweden	AR
▼ Switzerland	AR
Syria	F
Taiwan	AR
▲ Tajikistan	BR-
Tanzania	BR-
Thailand	BR
Togo	CR+
Trinidad and Tobago	BR
Tunisia	BR-
Turkey	BR
Turkmenistan	BR-
UAE	AR-
Uganda	BR-
Ukraine	BR-
▼ United Kingdom	AR-
United States	AR+
Uruguay	AR-
Uzbekistan	BR-
Venezuela	CR
Vietnam	BR
▼ Yemen	F
Zambia	CR
Zimbabwe	CR

Extremely low to low-risk

AR+

AR

AR-

Medium-risk

BR+

BR

BR-

High-risk

CR+

CR


CR-

Unmanageable risk

F

VAPOR Ratings methodology

VAPOR Ratings are based on the VAPOR (Value at Political Risk) model and platform developed in partnership with our partners Willis Towers Watson. VAPOR is an algorithmically driven system that models -- based on asset exposure and corporate risk environment across five perils and 14 industries -- the estimated average annual losses and probable maximum losses for political risk events over time. VAPOR Ratings allow for global views and country comparisons across all perils and industries for more than 160 countries and have been designed to help decision-makers map, measure and monitor exposure at an organisational level.



VAPOR Ratings are an independent opinion on political risk, which can serve as a useful starting point to assess the opportunities and risks of operating in a country. They provide a relative measure of a company or investor’s risk profile across countries based on expected frequency and severity of losses to political risk.

Political risk can be defined as the risk faced by investors, corporations and governments that specific political decisions, events or conditions will impact the earnings or value of assets. This is what we refer to as Value at Political Risk. It includes risk of expropriation, political violence, embargo, currency inconvertibility and sovereign default.

For organisations requiring a more precise approach to their political risk, we provide access to the **VAPOR Dataset** -- containing nearly 500,000 political risk data points, updated quarterly -- and to the full **VAPOR service**, an online platform giving annualised average and probable maximum expected losses in dollar terms, and permitting clients to explore the effects of different scenarios.

VAPOR services

VAPOR Ratings

(AR+ to F)

Overview of the likely frequency and severity of losses to political risk in a country.

Report published quarterly

VAPOR Dataset

Model your exposure across countries, risks and industries with nearly 500k quarterly datapoints for 160+ countries, across 5 risk perils and 14 industries for 10+ years.

Available as a subscription dataset for integration into clients' own modelling

VAPOR Online

Expected loss (% or \$)

For each country, across 5 risk perils and 14 industries. Estimate average annual losses and probable maximum losses to political risk events over time in dollar terms.

Available as an online subscription service

oxan.to/VAPOR



Oxford
Analytica

Oxford Analytica is an independent geopolitical analysis and advisory firm that draws on a worldwide network of experts to advise its clients on their strategies, operations, policies and investments.

Oxford Analytica's trusted insights and seasoned judgements on global issues enable its clients to navigate complex markets where the nexus of politics and economics, business and society is critical to success.

Founded in 1975, Oxford Analytica is the pioneer of geopolitical risk analysis, and today works with the world's most influential businesses, governments and international organisations.

www.oxan.com



Willis
Towers
Watson

Willis Towers Watson (NASDAQ: WLTW) is a leading global advisory, broking and solutions company that helps clients around the world turn risk into a path for growth. With roots dating to 1828, Willis Towers Watson has over 40,000 employees serving more than 140 countries. Willis Towers Watson designs and delivers solutions that manage risk, optimize benefits, cultivate talent, and expand the power of capital to protect and strengthen institutions and individuals.

www.willistowerswatson.com